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IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR Angela J. Davis* 
This article examines the role of prosecutors in establishing and main­
taining racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and examines efforts 
of the Prosecution and Racial Justice Program of the Ve,:-a Institute of Jus­
tice to enact reform within prosecutors' offices. After providing an overview 
of the debate on causes of such racial disparities generally, the article ex­
amines how seemingly race neutral charging and plea-bargaining decisions 
by prosecutors can actually cause and perpetuate racial disparities. As a 
model for reforming such practices, the article evaluates and critiques the 
Prosecution and Racial Justice Program and makes recommendations for 
how this program can be replicated across the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The racial disparities in our criminal justice system are extraordi­
nary and well-documented. In 1995, nearly one in three African 
American men between the ages of twenty. and twenty-nine were 
under the supervision of the criminal justice system-either in jail, 
prison, on probation, or on parole. 1 Today, one in every ten black 
males in his thirties is in prison or jail on any given day.2 Over 60% of 
all prisoners in 2010 were Black or Latino.3 The disparities exist at 
every step of the criminal process, from arrest through sentencing. 
Much has been written about why the American criminal justice 
system is so fraught with racial disparity.4 Some point to discrimina-I. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACKAMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER l (1995), avail­
able at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_youngblack_5yrs1ater .pdf. 2. Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=l22 (last visited Aug. 26, 2013). 3. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010, at26 (2011). Compare E. ANN CARSON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON­ERS IN 2011, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl l .pdf (stating that in 2010, 468,528 state inmates were white, while 518,763 were black), 
with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010 3 (2011) (stating that in 2010, whites alone comprised 72.4% of the U.S. population), available at http://www .census.gov /prod/cen20IO/briefs/c201 Obr-05. pdf. 4. See generally MARC MAUER, RAcE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006) (discussingthe alarming rate that our prison population has grown in the last few decades and the racial disproportionalities reflected in the increase); Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial 
Disproportionality of United States' Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL­OGY 1259 (1993) (exploring various explanations for the racial disproportionality in­cluding "racial discrimination in the criminal justice system" and "disproportionate involvement in criminal activity"); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Dis­
crimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction 
of Fact and Perception 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1411 (2004) (extending a previous study by Baldus that found gross racial inequities in the administration of the death penalty 
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tory decision-making by criminal justice officials at each step of the 
process while others suggest that disproportionate offending is the 
cause. In fact, there are many complex reasons for this unfortunate 
phenomenon. Criminal justice officials-including police officers, 
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials-make discretionary de­
cisions that often have a racial impact. In addition, the socioeconomic 
causes of crime disproportionately affect people of color.5 The impact 
of the War on Drugs cannot be overstated, and there are undoubtedly 
many other factors that have contributed to the startling statistics and 
overwhelming evidence of racial disparity. Not surprisingly, as the 
causes of the racial disparities in our criminal justice system stem 
from many sources, so must the solutions. 
In this article, I focus on prosecutors. As the most powerful offi­
cials in the criminal justice system, their discretionary decisions-es­
pecially their charging and plea-bargaining decisions-play a very 
significant role in creating and maintaining the racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system. The good news is that prosecutors can, if they 
wish, use that same power and discretion to help reduce these 
disparities. 
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute 
of Justice provides a model for reform that could help to eliminate 
unwarranted racial disparities in the criminal justice system. In this 
program, Vera Institute staff members work with prosecutors in se­
lected offices to help them analyze the racial impact of their decisions 
at various points of the process. According to the Program's website, 
it "works collaboratively with its partners to analyze data about the 
exercise and impacts of prosecutorial discretion; assists in developing 
routine policies and practices that promote fairness, efficiency, and 
professionalism in prosecution; and provides technical assistance to 
help prosecutors implement those measures."6 Researchers from the 
Vera Institute collect data at various decision points in prosecution 
offices and use a methodology that seeks to determine whether and 
how race neutral discretionary decisions have produced racial dispari-in Georgia); Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites: Cocaine 
Records Show Federal Officials Almost Solely Prosecute Nonwhites, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A l .  5. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action,47 J. LEGAL Eouc. 452, 453 (1997) (describing how low socioeconomic status and associated factors relating to poverty and social disadvantages to economic opportu­nity and attainment disproportionately affect people of color). 6. Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, VERA INsT. OF JusTICE, http://www.vera.org/centers/prosecution-and-racial-justice-program (last visited June 3, 2013). 
824 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 ties. If racial disparities are identified, the chief prosecutor may then take corrective action to eliminate them. This article will discuss and evaluate the Prosecution and Racial Justice Program. Might it serve as a model that could be duplicated in prosecution offices across the country? To what extent might it effec­tively reduce racial disparities? How might the model be improved? Part I will briefly discuss the racial disparity problem and some of its causes. Part II will focus on the role of prosecutors and explain how their seemingly race neutral charging and plea-bargaining decisions can cause and perpetuate racial disparities. Part III will discuss the Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, including its history and cur­rent projects. Part IV will analyze and critique the program by exam­ining its successes and challenges. Finally, Part V will provide recommendations for successful duplication of the program in addi­tional prosecution offices. I. 
RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM The statistics are startling. In 1954, there were about 100,000 Af­rican Americans in America's prisons and jails.7 Today, there are al­most 900,000.8 Current research suggests that one of every three African American males born today can expect to go to prison at some point in his lifetime, as can one of every six Latino males.9 One of every eighteen African American females and one of every forty-five Hispanic females face a similar fate. 10 This data appears even starker when compared to the statistics for their white counterparts: One in seventeen White males and one in 111 White females can expect to spend time in prison. I I Scholars debate the reasons for the disparity, although most agree that it is caused by a combination of factors, including disproportion­ate offending in certain categories of crime, discriminatory decision­making by criminal justice officials, certain criminal justice policies and practices, and the War on Drugs. Most of the disagreement centers around which of these factors plays the most significant role in caus­ing and perpetuating racial disparities. 12 In fact, it would be very diffi-7. Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S,
88S (2011). 
8. Id.
9. Id.
JO. Id.
11. Id.12. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RAcE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998);MAUER, supra note 4; Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, supra note 6. 
2013] IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE 825 cult, if not impossible, to determine the precise extent to which each of these factors contributes to the racial disparities in our criminal jus­tice system; they all play a role. Although this article focuses on the role of the prosecutor, 13 disproportionate offending, racial profiling, and the War on Drugs all contribute to the disparities. 
A. Disproportionate OffendingThe proponents of the disproportionate offending theory claim that African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system because they commit a disproportionate number of crimes. 14 One of the problems with relying on this theory is that there is no accurate mechanism for measuring the rate of off end­ing. Although it would seem natural to rely on arrest statistics, they are not a reliable measure of how many crimes are committed because of the discretionary nature of the police function. A police officer may arrest an individual if there is probable cause to believe that the indi­vidual committed a crime. 15 But even if there is probable cause, with very few exceptions, a police officer is not required to make an ar­rest.16 In one neighborhood, a police officer may break up a neighbor­hood fight and negotiate a truce between the parties without making an arrest. That same police officer might decide to arrest everyone involved in a similar fight in another neighborhood, creating a record of criminality. In addition, not all crimes are reported to the police. Scholars have studied and evaluated arrest records and imprison­ment rates to try to determine the extent to which bias may play a role in the criminal justice process. Alfred Blumstein's 1982 study com­pared African American arrest rates with African American imprison-
13. See infra Part III.
14. See generally WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JusncE
SYSTEM (1986); Heather McDonald, ls the Criminal Justice System Racist?, CITY J., 
Spring 2008, http://www.city-journal.org/2008/18_2_criminaljustice_system.htm1; 
Jason Riley, Opinion, Race, Politics and the Zimmerman Trial, WALL ST. J., July 15, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB l 000 l 424127887323394504578608 l 8255024 7 
030.html.
15. See generally U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (upholding the constitution­
ality of warrantless arrests as long as they are based on probable cause); 5 AM. JuR. 
2D Arrest § 14 (2013) (illustrating that probable cause, as it has been incorporated 
into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is a common sense determination based 
on the reasonably cautious suspicion that an offense has been committed and that the 
suspect committed it). 
16. But see ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(l )  (2012) ("[A] peace officer, with or
without a warrant, shall arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . .
the person has committed domestic violence" (emphasis added)); CoLo. REv. STAT. 
18-6-803.6(1) (2012); D.C. CoDE § 16-103l(a) (2012); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 19.2-81.3
(2013) N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-12 (West 2005).
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ment rates in eleven categories of crime. 17 Blumstein concluded "that 
in a nonbiased system, racial proportions in arrests would be mirrored 
in racial proportions imprisoned." 18 He determined the percentage of 
unexplained disproportionality for each category. Not surprisingly, 
this percentage was low for homicide and aggravated assault (2.8% 
and 5.2% respectively); 19 one would assume that for these serious of­
fenses, police officers would more likely make an arrest, regardless of 
the race of the defendant or victim. However for the other categories 
of offenses, the percentage of unexplained disproportionality was rela­
tively high-from 26% to 46%.20 The highest percentage-48.9%­
was for drug offenses.21
Assuming the accuracy and reliability of Blumstein's study, it 
reveals a significant amount of unexplained disproportionality. This 
unexplained disproportionality suggests that the incarceration of a 
very large number of African Americans may be based, at least in 
part, on racial bias at some point in the criminal justice process.22 For 
drug offenses, it would appear that almost half of African Americans 
may have been incarcerated as a result of such bias. However, because 
the study relies on arrest records, which do not accurately reflect rates 
of offending, it cannot accurately reflect the extent to which racial bias 
permeates the criminal justice system. 
In sum, disproportionate offending among African Americans 
and Latinos accounts for some of the racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system, but it is difficult to quantify. For some offenses-like 
drug offenses, for example-disproportionate offending does not ap­
pear to be a significant factor. Since drug arrests and convictions ac­
count for such a high percentage of individuals in prisons and jails,23 17. Alfred A. Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States' Prison
Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1275 (1982). 18. Id. at 1264.19. Id. at 1274.20. Id.
21. Id.22. Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revis­
ited, 64 U. Cow. L. REv. 743, 749 (1993) ("Racial discrimination is part of the residual not accounted for. Such discrimination could account for a part, or all, of the twenty percent not accounted for by the differential involvement in arrest--or perhaps for even more than twenty percent). Examination of 1991 data shows that " ... the racial disproportionality situation for the crimes other than drugs is roughly compara­ble in 1991 to what it was in 1979." Id. at 754. 23. Drug Policy, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/tem­plate/page.cfm?id=I28 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) ("At the Federal level, prisoners incarcerated on a drug charge comprise half of the prison population, while the num­ber of drug offenders in state prisons has increased thirteen-fold since 1980."). 
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the role of disproportionate offending in the overall calculus of the 
racial disparity problem is, at best, uncertain. B. Racial Profiling
Many scholars have written about the discriminatory effect of 
discretionary decision-making by criminal justice officials, especially 
at the arrest and prosecution stages of the process.24 Police and prose­
cutors exercise vast discretion in the performance of their duties and 
responsibilities, and sometimes that discretion is exercised in ways 
that result in different treatment of defendants and victims. Even if 
police and prosecutors do not intend to discriminate against defen­
dants because of their race, their race neutral decision-making some­
times has a racial effect. Judicial decisions and certain criminal justice 
policies also play a role. 
Police officers engage in racial profiling when they suspect an 
individual is engaging in criminal behavior because of that person's 
race or ethnicity. The practice is based on racial stereotypes and 
manifests itself in many different ways. The term "Driving While 
Black" or "DWB" is used to describe the phenomenon of pretextual 
traffic stops in which police officers stop African American drivers on 
the pretext of giving them a traffic ticket so that they may question 
them, ask for consent to search, and otherwise investigate them for 
crimes for which they have no basis to suspect them.25 With all forms 
of racial profiling, police officers stop and question and/or search indi­
viduals solely because of their race or ethnicity when they have 
24. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET's GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JusncE
(2009) (presenting various proposals to combat discriminatory practices and mass in­
carceration in the criminal justice system); MILTON HEUMANN & LANCE CAsSAK, 
GooD CoP, BAD Cop: RACIAL PROFILING AND COMPETING V1Ews OF JusTICE IN 
AMERICA (3d ed. 2007) (exploring the impact of racial profiling on racial and ethnic 
minorities); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CAN­
NOT WORK (2003) (discussing how racial profiling is unjust and ineffective in 
preventing crime or apprehending criminals); Mark D. Rosenbaum & Daniel P. 
Tojaki, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and Criminal Justice, 98 M1cH. L. REv. 
I 941 (2000) ( discussing some of the many overt abuses of power by law enforcement 
officials that have affected racial minorities); Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony 
Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507 (1976) (focusing on 
the powerful role that the prosecutor plays in the enforcement of laws); Developments 
in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, IOI HARV. L. REv. 1472 (1988) (review­
ing the impact that criminal justice officials can have at all stages of the criminal 
charging and sentencing process). 
25. See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and The Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (discussing the many 
instances where African Americans who have been subjected to pretextual traffic 
stops and the deleterious effects that "DWB" stops have on African American 
communities). 
828 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 neither reasonable suspicion26 nor probable cause27 to believe they are engaged in criminal activity. Racial profiling was so rampant in New York City that a class action lawsuit was brought against the city. In Floyd v. New York City, the plaintiffs challenged the police department's stop and frisk policy as being in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 28 During the trial, the plaintiffspresented overwhelming evidence that police officers were stopping individuals based on their race or ethnicity with neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion.29 In an extraordinary opinion issued on Au­gust 12, 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled for the plaintiffs, find­ing that New York City's stop and frisk policy violated the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.30 Judge Scheindlin found that senior officials in the City and New York Police Department were "deliberately indifferent" to unconstitutional stop and frisks and that these practices were sufficiently widespread to have the "force of law."31 She further found that the police department had a policy of indirect racial profiling based on criminal suspect data and that senior officials in the City and police department were deliberately indiffer­
ent to the intentionally discriminatory practices at the officer and man­agerial levels. 32 The city of New York has appealed the decision. 33 Although racial profiling has been formally condemned by legis­lators, 34 police chiefs,35 and even the President of the United States,36 26. See 5 AM. JuR. 2D. § 14, supra note 15.27. See generally Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Con­
sidering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Omo ST. L.J. 99 (1999) (arguing against the "broken-windows" theory, where the appearance of a neighborhood is said to justifiably arouse "reasonable suspicion" in the minds of law enforcement officers). 28. 739 F. Supp. 2d 376, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).29. Id. at 378-79, 383-85. See also Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153,170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[T]he frequency of alleged injuries ... here creates a likelihood of future injury sufficient to address any standing concerns ... As [plain­tiffs] argue, these claims raise 'central questions of fact and law that, when answered, will resolve all class members' Monell claims against the City."'). 30. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *75(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 31. Id. at *70.32. Id. at *72.33. See Benjamin Weiser, City Asks Coun to Vacate Rulings on Policing Tactic,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2013, at A31. 34. See Racial Profiling Prevention Act, H.R. 838, I 13th Cong. (2013); see also
Ending Racial Profiling in America Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., I 12th Cong. (2012) (recounting the instances of racial profiling in immigration and terrorism policy in the 21st Century). 
2013] IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE 829 police officers continue to engage in the practice.37 The Supreme Court has held that police officers may stop a driver as long as he has probable cause to believe the individual has committed a traffic of­fense, even if it is a pretextual traffic stop.38 The Court made it clear that any claim of racial discrimination must be based on the Equal Protection Clause and requires a showing that the officer engaged in intentional discrimination. 39 Proving intentional race-based discrimi­nation is difficult, and often police officers do not discriminate inten­tionally. Racial profiling may be based on unconscious racism40 or implicit bias, for which there is no legal remedy.41In addition to the practice of racial profiling, police officers con­tribute to racial disparities when they engage in more heavy-handed police practices in neighborhoods of color than in white neighbor­hoods.42 When police maintain a presence in neighborhoods of color and are absent from white neighborhoods, it is no surprise that they will arrest African Americans and Latinos while declining to arrest their similarly situated white counterparts. The failure to arrest whites who engage in criminal behavior contributes to racial disparity as much as the blatant practice of racial profiling. 35. See PORTLAND PoLICE BUREAU, PLAN TO ADDRESS RACIAL PROFILING 3 (2009)(discussing Chief Roseanne M. Sizer's plan to research and curtail racial profiling in Portland, Oregon); cf Matthew Kauffman, Police Chief Pleads for Clarity in Racial­
Profiling Law, HARTFORD CouRANT, Mar. 12, 2012, http://courantblogs.com/investi­gative-reporting/police-chief-pleads-for-clarity-in-racial-profiling-law/ (showing that local Hartford, CT, police chiefs support the collecting of data for profiling statistics). 36. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Obama Wades into a Volatile Racial Issue, N.Y.TIMES, July 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23race.html?_r=O (drawing on the unfounded arrest of Prof. Henry Louis Gates to highlight President Obama's opposition to racial profiling during his time as an Illinois Senator). 37. See Fernanda Santos, Judge Finds Violation of Rights by Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES,May 24, 2013, at A 14 ( discussing the ruling by an Arizona federal district judge that Sheriff Joe Arpaio and his deputies violated the rights of Latinos by targeting them during raids and traffic stops in Maricopa County, AZ). 38. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).39. See id. at 813.40. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon­
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (explaining that subconscious biases, while not overt, nonetheless inform racially disproportionate criminal justice practices). 41. See Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role 
of the Prosecutor, 39 CoLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 202, 205-07 (2007). 42. See generally Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C1v1L LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Oct. 30, 2013); George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLAN­nc, Mar. 1, 1982, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-win dows/304465/. 
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C. The War on Drugs
The term "War on Drugs" was first used widely in 1973 when 
President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration 
("DEA") to announce "an all-out global war on the drug menace."43 
During the 1980s, it escalated drastically with the passage of numer­
ous draconian drug laws carrying long prison terms and mandatory 
minimum sentences on both the federal and state levels.44 States re­
ceived federal funding to increase arrests and prosecutions,45 and not 
surprisingly, a disproportionate number of the arrestees were African 
American and Latino. In the mid-1980s, drug arrests went from 
581,000 in 1980 to 1,663,000 in 2009.46 The number of incarcerated 
drug offenders rose from about 41,000 persons in 1980 to nearly 
500,000 by 2003.47 The racial disparities steadily increased as well. 
African Americans constituted 21 % of drug arrests in 1980 and that 
number rose to 36% in 1992.48 African Americans only constitute 
about 13% of the population.49 
Although the laws appeared to be race neutral, they were en­
forced in ways that produced racial disparities. Data on regular drug 
users collected by the Department of Health and Human Services has 
consistently shown over the years that African Americans use drugs at 
the same rate as whites.50 In light of that fact, one would not expect 
racial disparities in drug arrests, prosecutions or convictions. Data col­
lected in 1993 revealed that although African Americans only com­
prised 13% of all monthly drug users, they were 35% of arrests for 
drug possession and 55% of all drug convictions.51 Although statistics 
on drug distribution are not as readily available, the existing research 
suggests that individuals who purchase drugs are much more likely to 43. Claire Suddath, The War on Drugs, TIME, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599, 1887 488,00.html ( exploring the history of the War on Drugs as it reflects our relations with Mexico and South America). 44. See generally Clarence Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Signifi­
cance of Race and America's Drug Crisis, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 95-99, 101-02 (1994) (discussing the implementation of mandatory minimums in the context of the war on drugs). 45. See id. at 99-100 (discussing the war on drugs' disparate impact on minorityarrests and criminal prosecution). 46. Mauer, supra note 7, at 94S.47. Id.48. Id.49. USA: People Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 25, 2013, I :52 PM),http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/OOOOO.html. 50. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAM­ICS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 7 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ doc/dp_raceanddrugs.pdf. 51. MAUER & HULING, supra note I, at 12.
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purchase them from someone of their own race, 52 suggesting that there 
must be a significant number of whites involved in drug distribution. 
Congress passed cocaine laws that particularly exacerbated the 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system.53 The penalties for 
possession and distribution of cocaine were vastly different, depend­
ing on whether it was in powder or crack form. Crack cocaine offenses 
were penalized at 100 times the rate of powder cocaine offenses. The 
penalty for distribution of 500 grams of powder cocaine was 5 
mandatory minimum years in prison while distribution of only 5 
grams of crack cocaine carried the same penalty.54 Since African 
Americans were much more likely to be arrested and prosecuted for 
crack cocaine offenses, this 100: 1 disparity greatly contributed to the 
racial disparities in the prosecution of drug offenses. In 2010, Con­
gress reduced the disparity to 18: 1. 55 
Other laws that contribute to racial disparity include laws that 
enhanced the penalty for drug offenses committed near schools-usu­
ally 500 to 1,000 feet. 56 These laws appear to be race neutral and seem 
to promote the goal of protecting children from drug dealers. How­
ever, because a disproportionate number of people of color live in ur­
ban areas and near schools, the laws have a racially disparate effect.57 
Disproportionate off ending in certain categories of crimes ( de­
spite the difficulty predicting its impact), racial profiling, the War on 
Drugs, and certain sentencing laws and policies all contribute to racial 
disparity in the criminal justice system. The role that prosecutors play 
in the equation is unique because of their extraordinary power and 
discretion. The impact of their discretion, power, and decision-making 
cannot be overstated. 52. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEARQUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 21-22 (2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25year quagmire.pdf (citing K. JACK RILEY, NAT'L INST. OF JusTICE, CRACK, PowDER Co­CAINE, AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND UsE PATTERNS IN Srx CITIES I (1997)). 53. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207(1986) (prior to 2010 amendment). 54. Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities, supra note 7, at 94S.55. See id. at 95S; see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-220, § 2,124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 56. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2.57. See id.
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THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system. They make the decisions that control the system, and they exercise almost boundless discretion in making those decisions. 58 Many argue that police officers are the most important officials in their role as the gatekeepers who bring individuals into the system.59 There is no doubt that police officers exercise broad discretion in de­ciding whether to stop and/or arrest individuals for criminal behavior. However, police officers only have the power to bring individuals to the courthouse door. It is the prosecutors whose decisions keep them there and firmly entrench them in the system-decisions that have life-changing consequences. The most important prosecutorial decisions are the charging and plea bargaining decisions.60 Prosecutors control and almost predeter­mine the outcome of criminal cases through these two critical deci­sions. They decide whether to charge an individual with a crime and what the charge or charges  should be, and they enjoy vast discretion in making this decision. Even if a prosecutor believes she can prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, she is not required to charge that individual.61 If she does decide to charge, she often has discretion to charge either a misdemeanor or felony. For example, if an individual is arrested with a large quantity of cocaine, the police officer might recommend that the person be charged with Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine-a felony that carries a mandatory minimum sentence. The prosecutor has a number of choices. She may decide to charge the person with the felony, but she also has the dis­cretion to charge him with simple possession-a misdemeanor that may result in a probationary sentence with fewer collateral conse­quences. The prosecutor may also choose not to charge the person at 
58. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 5 (2007); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary 
System, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669, 671-72 (1992) (acknowledging the immense power 
that a prosecutor wields in the criminal justice process); Thomas & Fitch, supra note 
24, at 509 (focusing on the powerful role that the prosecutor plays in the enforcement 
of laws). 
59. See, e.g., Larry J. Siegel, Police and Law Enforcement, in CRIMINOLOGY
498-533 (7th ed. 2000) ("Police are the gatekeepers to the criminal justice process
and they use their power of arrest to initiate the criminal justice process.").
60. See DAVIS, supra note 58, at 22, 43.
61. See Melilli, supra note 58, at 673 ("A decision not to prosecute, or to dismiss a
pending prosecution, may be made even in the face of sufficient evidence for 
conviction."). 
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all. The charging decision is totally within the discretion of the 
prosecutor. 
Prosecutors enjoy the same discretion in the plea-bargaining pro­
cess. They are not required to offer the defendant a plea to a lesser 
offense, but if they do, they decide what that offer will be.62 Certainly 
a defendant may agree to plead guilty to a lesser offense if the prose­
cutor dismisses all other offenses, but the decision is up to the prose­
cutor. And with the existence of so many offenses that carry 
mandatory minimum sentences, the plea bargaining power has become 
even more important. Since going to trial always carries the risk of 
conviction, the only way a defendant can be assured that he will not be 
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence is to 
plead guilty to a lesser offense. Ninety-five percent of all criminal 
cases are resolved by way of a plea.63 Prosecutors' control of the 
charging and plea-bargaining decisions almost permits them to prede­
termine the outcome of most criminal cases. 
Charging and plea-bargaining decisions have a tremendous im­
pact on racial disparities in the criminal justice system.64 If a prosecu­
tor charges an African American with a crime but chooses not to 
charge his similarly situated white counterpart,65 or chooses to charge 
the white counterpart with a less serious offense, she will create an 
unwarranted disparity. But the problem is a complex one. A prosecu­
tor is rarely presented with two cases-one white defendant, one 
black-with exactly the same circumstances (same prior record, same 
facts, etc.) where she consciously chooses to treat the black defendant 
more harshly. She may unconsciously empathize with a white defen­
dant and give him preferable treatment, or she may offer a white de­
fendant better treatment for legitimate reasons that produce a racial 
impact. 
Consider the case of a white defendant who is arrested for selling 
cocaine in his dorm room. The arresting officer recommends that he 62. See LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1-2 (2011). 63. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky,130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485-86 (2010)). 64. See BESIK! KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Do RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER IN PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 13-14 (2012), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race­and-ethnicity-in-prosecution-first-edition.pdf; Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (2009)( discussing the role of the prosecutor in the Jena Six cases in Jena, Lousiana in 2007).65. A "similarly situated" white counterpart would be someone who has committedthe same crime, with the same prior record and who has other similar characteristics relevant to the charging decision. 
834 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 be charged with distribution of cocaine-a felony offense with a five year mandatory minimum sentence. The defendant's parents hire an attorney who tells the prosecutor that the defendant is suffering from a debilitating drug addiction and was selling drugs only to support his own addiction. The attorney indicates that the defendant has been ac­cepted to a six-month program at a residential drug treatment facility. He also informs the prosecutor that the defendant is an honor student who planned to apply to law school, that he has never been arrested in his life, and that a felony conviction would ruin his career and his life. A prosecutor might legitimately offer such a defendant a plea to a misdemeanor offense, or even dismiss the case all together. One could see how a prosecutor might empathize with such a defendant, subconsciously seeing himself and perhaps remembering his own "youthful indiscretions." That same prosecutor might handle the case of a similarly situ­ated black defendant quite differently. Consider the black defendant arrested for selling cocaine on the street comer in his neighborhood. The arresting office recommends the same charge-distribution of co­caine. This defendant is poor and represented by an overworked public defender. The public def ender discovers that his client is addicted to cocaine and was selling the drug only to support his habit. The family cannot afford to pay for residential treatment and there are no free programs available. The defendant does not have a prior criminal re­cord but is a high school dropout with no employment prospects. The public defender asks the prosecutor to consider dismissing the case, and the prosecutor declines. The prosecutor's decisions in these cases would produce a racial disparity, but were her decisions unfair or unjustified? Shouldn't a prosecutor pursue an outcome that results in an alternative to incarcer­ation, thereby saving scarce government resources, especially if she does not believe that the defendant poses a danger to the community? Is it the prosecutor's fault that the black defendant could not afford to pay for a drug program and was neither employed nor in school? Yet the black defendant did not appear to be any more deserving of a prison term than the white defendant. The prosecutor may have had an unconscious bias towards the white defendant and against the black defendant, but how could that be proven? And even if it were true, would it matter, considering all the other factors? If prosecutors charge African American and Latino defendants with crimes while neglecting to charge their similarly situated white counterparts, they may be  engaging in race-based selective prosecu-
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tion. Race-based selective prosecution violates the Constitution,66 but
proving it is difficult. As with racial profiling, the victim of selective 
prosecution must prove that the prosecutor intended to discriminate 
against him because of his race. 67 The Court practically closed the
door on all claims of race-based selective prosecution when it decided 
United States v. Armstrong. 68 In Armstrong, the Court held that in
order to get discovery to prove selective prosecution, the defendant 
must show that similarly situated whites could have been charged, but 
were not69-an impossible showing for almost anyone.70 
The Supreme Court has consistently required proof of intentional 
discrimination in criminal cases, and the amount and type of proof 
necessary have made successful challenges extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. In McCleskey v. Kemp,11 Mr. McCleskey presented a so­
phisticated study of how the death penalty was implemented in the 
state of Georgia. The study, conducted by Professors David Baldus, 
Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (known as "the Baldus 
Study") produced startling racial disparities in the implementation of 
the death penalty and concluded that black defendants who kill whites 
were more likely to receive a death sentence. 72 The Court accepted the
validity of the study and its findings, but nonetheless declined to re­
verse Mr. McCleskey's death sentence.73 Because the study did not
prove that the prosecutors in Mr. McCleskey's case intended to dis­
criminate against him because of his race, the Court rejected his claim. 
The difficulty of proving intentional discrimination does not pose 
the most difficult challenge, since intentional discrimination is rarely 
the cause of racial disparity in today's criminal justice system. Most 
racial disparities are caused and/or exacerbated by prosecutors' race­
neutral decisions which may be influenced by unconscious racism. 
66. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("[l]t was not stated that the
[selective prosecution claim) was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."). 
67. See Ah Sin v. Whitman, 198 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1905) (ruling that in order to
establish a discriminatory effect, the plaintiff must show that similarly situated indi­
viduals of a different race were not prosecuted). 
68. 517 U.S. 456, 465-66 (1996) (citing Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 507-08).
69. See id.
70. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline UnethicalProsecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 276, 307 (2007) (discussing the lack of en­
forcement of prosecutorial misconduct policies and the insurmountable burden that 
citizens face in showing selective prosecution). 
71. 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 297 ("Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insuffi­
cient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case 
acted with discriminatory purpose."). 
836 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 These race neutral decisions, even though unintentional, may have a racial impact. Whether or not prosecutors intentionally or unconsciously dis­criminate against defendants of color in the charging and plea-bargain­ing processes, their decisions-even the race-neutral ones-may cause or exacerbate racial disparities. Their tremendous power and discretion is often exercised in ways that produce unintended and un­desirable consequences. However, that same power and discretion can be used to remedy the problem. The next section will examine one possible solution. III. 
THE PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE PROGRAM In 1998 in an article entitled "Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion," I proposed "the use of racial impact stud­ies in prosecution offices to advance the responsible, nondiscrimina­tory exercise of prosecutorial discretion."74 The racial impact studies would involve the collection and publication of data on the race of the defendant and the victim in each case for each category of offense and the prosecutorial action taken at each stage of the criminal process. The data would be analyzed to determine if race appeared to be related to the prosecutorial decisions. These studies would possibly reveal the racially discriminatory impact of race-neutral discretionary decisions and policies and help prosecutors formulate policies and guidelines to reduce racial disparities. Finally, I recommended the publication of the studies to inform the general public about prosecutorial practices and enable them to hold elected prosecutors accountable. The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute of Justice is an innovative program that involves the collection and analysis of data in prosecution offices to determine the impact of dis­cretionary decisions. According to the Program's website: 
Vera's Prosecution and Racial Justice Program (PRJ) enhances 
prosecutorial accountability and performance through partnerships 
with prosecutors' offices nationwide. PRJ works collaboratively 
with its partners to analyze data about the exercise and impacts of 
prosecutorial discretion; assists in developing routine policies and 
practices that promote fairness, efficiency and professionalism in 
prosecution; and provides technical assistance to help prosecutors 
implement those measures. By collaborating with prosecutors, ana­
lyzing data, and devising solutions, PRJ works alongside prosecu-74. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,67 foRDHAM L. REv. 13, 18 (1998). 
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tors to improve their performance and related criminal justice 
outcomes.75 
837 
The PRJ staff developed a series of performance indicators that 
focus on four significant points in the prosecutorial process that in­
volve the exercise of discretion: initial case screening, charging, plea 
offers, and final disposition.76 The program's methodology allowed 
them to discover whether similarly situated defendants were being 
treated differently at each of these steps in the process. 
A. History
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program ("PRJ") was estab­
lished in 2005 with the goal of helping prosecutors "manage the exer­
cise of discretion within their offices in a manner that reduces the risk 
of racial disparity in the decision-making process."77 To be effective, 
the program required chief prosecutors to grant Vera Institute staff 
broad access to their offices in order to track decision-making at key 
discretion points with the goal of identifying patterns of disparity. 
PRJ's first director was Wayne McKenzie, a prosecutor in the Kings 
County District Attorney's Office in Brooklyn, New York. Mr. Mc­
Kenzie took a leave of absence from his office to direct the program. 
His status as a prosecutor gave the program credibility with the partic­
ipating prosecutors and staff and helped to secure their cooperation. 
The first chief prosecutors to volunteer for the Program were Pe­
ter Gilchrist of Charlotte, North Carolina, Paul Morrison of Johnson 
County, Kansas,78 and Michael McCann of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
The Vera Institute staff reached out to these prosecutors because they 
enjoyed an excellent reputation in the prosecution community and in 
their jurisdictions. Other factors that made these prosecutors suitable 
for the project included the location of their offices and the 
demographics of their communities.79 
75. Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, supra note 6.
76. WAYNE McKENZIE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL
JUSTICE: USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 2 (2009), 
available at https://files.nyu.edu/dac229/public/2009_03_06_PRJ_8page_FINAL.pdf. 
77. Wayne McKenzie, Briefing Memorandum for Advisory Board Meeting in
Charlotte (Dec. 1, 2005), in DAVIS, supra note 59, at 192. 
78. Paul Morrison withdrew before beginning the project because he left the chief
prosecutor position to run for Attorney General of the state. See infra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
79. See Charlotte, Nonh Carolina, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS Bu­
REAU (June 27, 2013, 2: 10 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37 /3712000 
.html (providing the following figures: White alone, percent 2010: 50.0%, Black or 
African American alone, percent 2010: 35.0%, Hispanic or Latino, percent 2010: 
I 3.1 % ); Johnson County, Kansas, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
838 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 
B. Findings in Mecklenburg County and Milwaukee
1. Mecklenburg County District Attorney's Office, Charlotte, North
Carolina
The Vera Institute staff began their work in the Mecklenburg
County prosecutor's office in Charlotte, North Carolina. The PRJ staff 
worked hard to establish a good working relationship with the prose­
cutors and support staff. They had to convince the Charlotte staff that 
they were not there to place blame or label them as "racists" but to 
help them enforce the law effectively and fairly. Key to the program's 
success in Charlotte was the fact that PRJ was directed by a former 
prosecutor. Another factor that helped secure buy-in was the fact that 
the data collection and management system that Vera implemented not 
only helped discover possible bias, but it also helped them manage 
their caseloads. 
The findings in Charlotte were quite revealing. The supervising 
prosecutors were surprised to discover that the office was prosecuting 
almost 97% of all drug cases-a very high percentage considering the 
fact that the office was prosecuting only 70% of all cases combined. 80 
Another surprising finding was that African American women were 
treated more harshly than members of any other group-I 00% of the 
drug cases involving African American women were prosecuted.81 
The Assistant District Attorneys had been adopting the police officer's 
charging recommendations in 98.9% of the cases, and 70% of the de­
fendants charged were people of color. 82 
PJR's findings prompted the District Attorney, Peter Gilchrist, to 
take action. He appointed different people to the supervisory positions 
and implemented policies that required the Assistant District Attor­
neys to screen the cases more carefully. These changes resulted in a 
reduction of the percentage of drug cases charged to 88% and a de-
(June 27, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20/20091.html (pro­
viding the following figures: White alone, percent 2012: 87.9, Black or African Amer­
ican alone, percent 2012: 4.8%, Hispanic or Latino, percent 2012: 7.4%); Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 2013, 2:19 
PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5553000.html (providing the follow­
ing figures: White alone, percent 2010: 44.8%, Black or African American alone, 
percent 2010: 40.0%, Hispanic or Latino, percent 2010: 17.3%). 
80. McKENZIE ET AL., supra note 77, at 7. 
81. Id.
82. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the Sub­
comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judici­
ary, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (testimony of Wayne S. McKenzie, Director of the 
Prosecution & Racial Justice Program, Vera Institute of Justice), available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/McKenzie091029.pdf. 
2013] IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE 839 crease in the decision to prosecute cases involving African American females.83 Mr. Gilchrist met with community members and informed them of ·his office's participation in PRJ and their findings and re­ceived positive feedback.84 Peter Gilchrist retired effective December 31, 2010. His successor, R. Andrew Murray, did.not continue the rela­tionship with PRJ, so the program is no longer in effect at that office. 
2. Milwaukee, County District Attorney's Office, Milwaukee,
WisconsinMichael McCann had been the District Attorney in Milwaukeefor 37 years when he decided that his office would partner with PRJ. Following his retirement in 2006, his successor, John Chisholm, con­tinued with the program. His office has implemented the most suc­cessful and long-standing model of the program to date. Mr. Chisholm continues to work with the program and its current director, Whitney Tymas, who is also a former prosecutor. PRJ has completed statistical studies in the Milwaukee office in four categories of crimes: Posses­sion of Drug Paraphernalia, Prostitution, Resisting or Obstructing an Officer, and Domestic Violence. 
a. Possession of Drug ParaphernaliaWhen PRJ staff members first began their work in Milwaukee in 2006, they examined the initial case screening decisions for the nine most frequently occurring crime categories. In six of those nine cate­gories, they found that prosecutions against people of color were de­clined at a slightly higher percentage than whites. 85 However, the results were reversed when it came to public order and drug offenses. Specifically, they found that in 41 % of the arrests of whites for Pos­session of Drug Paraphernalia, the prosecutors declined to prosecute compared to only 27% of people of color arrested for the same of­fense. 86 The supervising prosecutors met to discuss the possible rea­sons for this disparity. They discovered that inexperienced misdemeanor prosecutors were making most of these decisions. 87 They also discovered that a significant number of the drug parapher­nalia cases in the city of Milwaukee, where the majority of African Americans in the greater community reside, involved possession of crack pipes, while the paraphernalia in the suburban parts of the 
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7-8.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id.
87. McKENZIE ET AL., supra note 77, at 7.
840 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 county involved other types of paraphernalia. 88 One suggestion wasthat the junior prosecutors viewed crack cocaine as a more serious drug and therefore prosecuted the possession of crack pipes more aggressively.89John Chisholm responded to these findings by implementing new charging policies. He first explained to his staff that possession of crack cocaine paraphernalia was probably an indication of a drug ad­diction. He then directed his staff to decline prosecution in these cases and refer the arrestees to drug treatment. Any prosecutor who wanted to charge an individual with this offense was required to justify the decision and get approval from a supervisor.90 The new policy reme­died the racial disparity and resulted in an overall reduction in the prosecution of these cases.91 Mr. Chisholm hosted a number of com­munity meetings about his office's engagement with PRJ, the results of the findings, and his new policies, and the community response was very positive.92
b. ProstitutionThe PRJ staff examined prostitution cases referred to the Mil­waukee County District Attorney's Office between January 2009 and June 2010. Their initial examination of these cases showed that black defendants were much more likely to be charged than white defen­dants.93 They decided to examine the cases more closely by collectinginformation about the defendants' prior record and probation status and by examining the initial screening decision and whether the def en­dants were offered deferred prosecution.94 Their findings demon­strated that black defendants were more likely to be charged, but were also more likely to be offered deferred prosecution.95 An analysis ofcases involving female defendants revealed that black female defen­dants were more likely to be charged than white female defendants.96 88. Id.89. Id.90. Id.
91. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, supra note 83, at 8.
92. Id.
93. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CASE P ROCESSING ANALYSIS 
- PRosTITUTION 1 (2011) (on file with author).
94. "Deferred Prosecution" is a diversion program in which the defendant is re­
quired to fulfill certain conditions over a period of time (such as a two-year alcohol 
treatment program for a DUI). If the conditions are met, the case is dismissed. If the 
conditions are not met, the District Attorney's office proceeds with the prosecution. 
95. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 1, 7.
96. Id. at I.
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191 cases with a top charge of prostitution were referred to the 
District Attorney's Office.97 The majority of defendants were black 
(61%), female (65%), in custody (75%), referred by the Milwaukee 
Police Department (94%), and had a prior record (64%).98 The PRJ
staff examined the race and gender of the defendants and found that 
black defendants had the highest charge rate (89%) compared to a 
charge i;ate of 86% for white defendants.99 Most of the defendants 
were black females (42%), followed by white females (20%), black 
males (19%), and white males (14%).100 The charge issuance rate for
black females was 91 %, 87% for white females, 83% for black males, 
and 85% for white males.101 
The PRJ staff also examined the gender and level of experience 
of the prosecutors making the charging decisions. There were 34 pros­
ecutors reviewing prostitution cases during this time period. 102 The 
average number of years of experience was eight years, and the me­
dian was four years. 103 47% of the cases were reviewed by men and 
43% were reviewed by women. Women were more likely to bring 
prostitution charges than men - 99% of the cases vs. 81 %.104
When examining the existence of charging differences by race, 
the PRJ staff took into account a number of factors, including the de­
fendant's gender and age, the number of charges, the defendant's cus­
tody status, the prosecutor's gender, the referral agency (Milwaukee 
Police Department or other agency), the defendant's prior overall re­
cord and prior prostitution record, and the defendant's probation sta­
tus.105 Taking all of these factors into account, the charging rate was
only 2% higher for black defendants, a difference that might be ex­
plained by factors not considered. 106 The PRJ staff did a separate, sim­
ilar analysis focusing on female defendants only. This analysis 
97. Id. ''Top charge" refers to the most serious offense charged.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. The odds of case issuance were initially 9% higher for black defendants but
decreased to 2% when prior record and probation status were taken into account,
suggesting that much of the 9% difference was attributable to those two factors. Id. It
should be noted, however, that these findings are not statistically significant and there­
fore cannot be generalized to other jurisdictions.
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revealed that black female defendants were more likely to be charged 
than white defendants. 107 
The examination of whether a defendant was offered deferred 
prosecution revealed opposite results. The PRJ staff members con­
trolled for the same factors considered for the analysis of the charging 
decision. They found that the odds of receiving deferred prosecution 
were 10% higher for black defendants. 108 
c. Resisting or Obstructing an Officer
A total of 1,283 cases with a top charge of Resisting or Ob­
structing an Officer (hereinafter "RO") were referred to the Mil­
waukee County District Attorney's Office between January 2009 and 
June 2010. 56% of all the cases were charged with no difference be­
tween black and white defendants (55% of each racial group was 
charged).109 Most of the defendants charged were black (70% ), male 
(79% ), and in custody (80% of blacks and 66% of whites). 110 
The PRJ staff members decided to sample 200 cases (100 white 
defendants and 100 black defendants) and include information about 
the defendants' prior record and probation status. 111 Sixty-two percent 
of the cases in the sample were charged with R0. 112 Most of them 
were male (72% of whites, 81 % of blacks), in custody (68% of whites, 
73% of blacks), and had a prior record (57% of whites, 64% of 
blacks).113 Among defendants with a prior record, a similar percentage 
of white and black defendants were charged.114 
d. Domestic Violence
The findings from the Domestic Violence study were notable in 
that they included statistics on the race of the victim and the race of 
the defendant. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Prostitution 
might be characterized as victimless crimes, and because the victims 
in Resisting or Obstructing an Officer charges are all police officers, 
the impact of the race of the victim on the charging decision in those 
cases would likely be insignificant. However, domestic violence cases 
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id. at 9.
109. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CASE PROCESSING ANALYSIS
- RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER l (Sept. 13, 2011) (on file with author).I 10. Id.
11 l. Id. at 2 ( oversampling white defendants because a smaller proportion of the RO
defendant population was white). 
112. Id.113. Id.
114. Id. at 3.
2013] IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE 843 provided an opportunity to examine whether interracial cases were treated differently from intraracial cases, and if so, how. There were 10,455 domestic violence cases referred to the Dis­trict Attorney's Office between January 2009 and June 2010. 115 Mostof these defendants were black (74%), male (84%), and were referred by the Milwaukee Police Department (81 % ).116 The majority of vic­tims were black (69%) and female (83%).117 Ninety-one percent of thecases were intraracial (the defendant and victim were of the same race).118 Most cases involved a black defendant and victim (67%), fol­lowed by a white defendant and victim (24% ), a black defendant and a white victim (7%) and a white defendant and a black victim (1 % ).119The PRJ staff considered a number of factors in determining charging outcomes by the defendant's race, the victim's race, and the defendant's race and victim's race combined. These factors included: the defendant's gender, the victim's gender, the number of charges, the seriousness of the charge, the defendant's custody status, offense enhancers, and the referral agency (police department or other agency).120 When controlling for these factors, they found almost nodifference in the charging decision based on the defendant's race. 121However, they found that the odds of charging in cases involving black victims were 16% lower than in cases involving white vic­tims.122 There was an even more significant disparity in cases involv­ing black defendants and white victims - the odds were 34% higher that charges would be brought in these cases than in cases with a white defendant and white victim.123To address the disparities in the prosecution of domestic violence cases evident from PRJ' s findings, Mr. Chisholm invited PRJ staff members to participate in a series of meetings between members of his office, the law enforcement community, the domestic violence advo­cacy community, the probation department, and others. After the meetings were concluded, the PRJ staff recommended additional train­ing of prosecutors, investigators and representatives of the domestic violence advocacy community. The training took place in October 
115. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CASE PROCESSING ANALYSIS 
- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2 (201 l) (on file with author).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id.
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2012 and focused on providing effective strategies for working with 
victims from diverse races and cultures and on how to approach cases 
in which victims remain with their assailants - an occurrence that had 
been identified as associated with race, ethnicity, and socio-economic 
status in some instances. 124 Sarah M. Buel, a well-known domestic 
violence activist, facilitated the training. 125 
The training received positive feedback, so Mr. Chisholm asked 
PRJ to assist in arranging additional training with the goal of increas­
ing cultural competency when handling the cases in which the re­
search identified disparity-domestic violence and prostitution 
cases. 126 Mr. Chisholm is planning community brainstorming meet­
ings to promote community engagement and accountability. 127 The 
PRJ staff will share the findings from the research and inform commu­
nity stakeholders about the work. The PRJ staff also provided Mr. 
Chisholm's office with recommendations about how to improve the 
PROTECT system, (the acronym for the statewide data management 
system). These recommendations focused on changes that would facil­
itate future social science research. 128 
B. New Partners
Cyrus Vance, Jr., the District Attorney for the New York County 
District Attorney's Office, agreed to participate in the Prosecution and 
Racial Justice Program, and the PRJ staff began working in this office 
in January 2012. The funding for the work at this site (in the borough 
of Manhattan) was secured through a grant with the National Institute 
of Justice. The findings will be published when completed. PRJ will 
also begin studies at the Lancaster County Attorney's Office in Lin­
coln, Nebraska (headed by County Attorney Joe Kelly) and the San 
Francisco District Attorney's Office (under the leadership of District 
Attorney George Gascon) in early 2014. 124. Email from Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program,to Angela Davis (July 7, 2013, 3:45 PM) (on file with author).125. Id.126. Email from Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program,to Angela Davis (June 10, 2013, 1:09 PM) (on file with author).127. Id.128. Id.
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IV. PRJ AS A MODEL FOR REFORM 
A. AdvantagesPRJ has great potential as a model for prosecutors who want to improve the quality of justice by working to eliminate the unwarranted racial disparities in our criminal justice system. As the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system, prosecutors have the discretion and power to implement policies in their offices that can have a signif­icant and positive impact on this problem. The same lack of trans­parency that makes it difficult for their constituents to hold them accountable for the decisions they make can also provide the political cover to allow them to make significant changes-particularly at the charging stage of the process-that can help to reduce unwarranted racial disparities. PRJ provides a model for how this can be done. The PRJ model has many advantages over other approaches. First, it is evidence-based. The collection of data at key decision points in the process allows prosecutors to know whether their race neutral decisions have a racial effect. PRJ's methodology is based on regression analysis, which permits prosecutors to consider numerous relevant variables and the possible effect that each may have on out­comes. For example, the case analyses done in the Milwaukee District Attorney's Office demonstrated that the consideration of defendants' prior criminal record was a key factor in the charging decision that had a significant impact on racial disparities for certain offenses. 129 A prosecutor armed with this knowledge is in a much better position to make a decision about whether the disparities are unfair and unwar­ranted and what policies she might implement to reduce the disparities. A second benefit of the PRJ model is that it eliminates the need for blame. One of the biggest challenges to eliminating the racial dis­parity caused by criminal justice decision-makers is what to do when it appears that it is caused by racial bias-implicit or otherwise. No one wants to be called a racist, and when the bias is unconscious, "racist" may not be a fair label. At any rate, blaming individuals for unconscious bias is neither necessary nor advisable, as such blaming does nothing to solve the problem. Certainly, appropriate education and training about implicit bias would benefit any prosecution of­fice. 130 But the PRJ model allows a prosecutor to implement policies 129. See McKENZIE ET AL., supra note 77, at 6.130. See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.REv. 1124, 1169-77 (2012) ( examining how intervention strategies using training and
846 LEG/SI.AT/ON AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:821 and change practices that may be causing disparities without pointing fingers or punishing. A chief prosecutor who decides to implement the model in her office could achieve buy-in and support from staff by making make it clear from the outset that the purpose of the study is not to place blame, but to discover whether there are unwarranted bi­ases that may be corrected by a change in practices or policies. The chief prosecutor establishes the practices and policies of the office, so if any assistant prosecutor's implementation of those policies causes unwarranted racial disparity, it is ultimately the responsibility of the chief prosecutor. District Attorneys Gilchrist and Chisholm were able to successfully implement changes in policies without blaming or pun­ishing anyone on their staffs. A third advantage of the PRJ model is that it can be implemented without legislation or rule making. The legislative process is not only time-consuming, but prosecutors and legislators are almost always concerned about being seen as "soft on crime." A law that would man­date that prosecutors implement the PRJ model may be difficult to pass, as it may be seen as diverting resources from law enforcement. A chief prosecutor with the will and resources may proceed with the PRJ model without legislation or even without asking or informing anyone. Of course, the better practice would be for the chief prosecu­tor to inform and engage her constituents. District Attorneys Gilchrist and Chisholm informed criminal justice officials and community members about PRJ and were successful in getting buy-in and support for the project. 
B. ChallengesThe model, in its current form, does have its challenges. One of its advantages-the fact that it can be implemented without legisla­tion-may also be seen as a disadvantage. Without some enforcement mechanism, the program is dependent on the will, interest, and priori­ties of individual prosecutors. Few prosecutors view the elimination of racial disparities in the criminal justice system as their responsibility. Even those interested and concerned about the problem may be too occupied with what they view as their primary obligation-enforcing the laws and keeping their communities safe. Most prosecutors are extremely busy with the day-to-day work of bringing charges (includ­ing grand jury proceedings), litigating motions, interviewing and pre­paring witnesses, trying cases, and handling all of their other 
education can counter implicit biases in the courtroom by focusing on the judge and 
jury). 
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responsibilities. The idea of adding a major project to an already 
overburdened office probably would not be attractive to most 
prosecutors. 
If a prosecutor decides to go forward with the project, a lack of 
transparency may be a challenge to its success. One of the troubling 
characteristics of prosecution offices is the lack of transparency. Pros­
ecutors are not required to share information about their internal 
charging and plea-bargaining decisions, and the Supreme Court has 
protected this lack of transparency. 131 Without transparency, there is 
no accountability. If a prosecutor implements the PRJ model and dis­
covers unwarranted disparities, her constituents would not be able to 
hold her accountable for correcting them if the findings are not made 
public. Publication of the findings was not a condition of participation 
for PRJ's first partners. Peter Gilchrist and Michael McCann (and sub­
sequently John Chisholm) chose to communicate with their constitu­
ents about the program, and John Chisholm even released the findings 
from the program's work in 2009-2011. However, they were not re­
quired to do so. 132 
Even when a chief prosecutor decides to implement the model, its 
sustainability may be in jeopardy once that prosecutor leaves office. 
Shortly after agreeing to participate in PRJ in 2005, Paul Morrison 
announced that he was switching from the Republican to the Demo­
cratic Party and running for Attorney General of the state. With his 
political campaign and focus on a statewide office, Mr. Morrison did 
not have time to participate in PRJ. He ultimately won the election and 
began his tenure as Attorney General in January 2007. 133 
Bonnie Dumanis, the District Attorney of San Diego County, 
agreed to participate in PRJ soon after Paul Morrison withdrew. The 
San Diego County office worked with PRJ for approximately eighteen 
months before withdrawing from the program for similar reasons. Ms. 
Dumanis also ran a political campaign that left little time for directing 
and supervising the work of the program. 
I 3 I. See DAVIS, supra note 59; Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice: 
Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DuKE L.J. 131 (2007); Teah 
R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279 (2002).
132. PRJ's current Director, Whitney Tymas, implemented a Memorandum of Un­
derstanding with the New York County District Attorney's Office that included publi­
cation of the findings. Similar memoranda are expected with the Lincoln, Nebraska,
and San Francisco, California, partners.
133. Monica Davey, In Kansas, Top Official Announces his Resignation, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. I 5, 2007, at A 15 (reporting that Mr. Morrison took over for former Attor­
ney General Phil Kline in early 2007 and announced his resignation in December
2007 because of a scandal involving an extramarital affair with a former employee
who filed an EEOC claim alleging sexual harassment).
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When Peter Gilchrist left office, his successor chose not to 
continue the program. The Milwaukee District Attorney had a differ­
ent experience. Michael McCann's successor, John Chisholm, carried 
on the work very successfully. 
Another challenge to the success of the program is the availabil­
ity of resources. Few prosecutors have excess funds in their budgets. 
The Vera Institute obviously cannot support every prosecutor inter­
ested in implementing the PRJ model. Prosecutors would have to se­
cure funding to hire experts to conduct the studies in their offices. 134 
V. RECOMMEND A TIO NS 
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program has great potential 
for reducing racial disparities in our criminal justice system, but there 
are challenges that must be overcome to encourage its adoption by 
other prosecution offices. This section recommends possible solutions 
to some of these challenges. 
A. Information Campaign in the Prosecution Community
There should be an  information campaign in the prosecution 
community to inform and educate prosecutors about the PRJ model 
and why it is important to the prosecution function. Part of the cam­
paign would involve providing information about the racial disparity 
problem and its many disparate causes, including the racial impact of 
race neutral decision-making by prosecutors and other criminal justice 
officials. The emphasis should be on the important role that prosecu­
tors can play by making simple policy changes that would not threaten 
public safety. 
The best ambassadors for the information campaign would be the 
prosecutors who have implemented the model in their offices. The 
three well-known, well-respected prosecutors who participated in the 
program would be in the best position to convince other prosecutors of 
the importance and validity of the program. They would have the most 
credibility with other prosecutors, and their experiences (the successes 
and challenges) would be most valuable to prosecutors, whether they 
are interested or skeptical. The participating prosecutors might speak 
at conferences and meetings of prosecution organizations such as the 
134. Although it would be difficult to predict costs because so many variables are
involved and they differ from location to location, the estimated cost of the research
component of the eighteen-month Manhattan project was $390,000. Email from
Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, to Angela Davis
(Sept. 27, 2013, 12:00 PM) (on file with author).
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National District Attorneys Association, the American Prosecutors 
Research Institute, the National Association of Assistant United States 
Attorneys, the National Black Prosecutors Association, and similar 
organizations. 
B. Partnerships with Academic Institutions
Prosecutors interested in duplicating the PRJ model in their of­
fices will undoubtedly need funding. Although they could request 
funding from their state legislatures as part of their budget requests, 
with the budget challenges in most states, this probably would not be a 
reliable source of funding. Prosecutors might also seek grant funding 
from foundations and from the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. 135 
Interested prosecutors might also try to partner with an academic 
institution. PRJ is the type of project that would be of interest to aca­
demics in the criminology and statistics departments of many universi­
ties. Law professors might also be interested in participating in and 
supporting the project. A cross-disciplinary partnership would be 
ideal. Since academics routinely seek grant funding for worthwhile 
projects, such a partnership would relieve the prosecution office of the 
burden of funding and implementing the project. The academic insti­
tution would provide the funding and expertise. 
C. Transparency and Accountability
Prosecution offices that decide to implement the model should 
inform their constituents, seek their advice, and publish the findings of 
the project. Prosecutors who decide to participate probably will re­
present communities concerned about racial disparity issues. Prosecu­
tors should communicate with their constituents about all issues of 
concern, and should share any relevant information that is not confi­
dential. This transparency is essential to holding prosecutors accounta­
ble to the people they serve. They should not be concerned about 
revealing findings that show racial disparity. If the disparity is unwar­
ranted, the prosecutor should be prepared to change their practices 
and/or policies to eliminate it. If the disparity is justifiable, the prose­
cutors should explain the reasons for the disparity to her constituents. 
Publishing the findings and communicating about the project with 135. PRJ received funding from the National Institute of Justice for their partnershipwith the New York County District Attorney's Office. Besiki Kutateladze,
Prosecutorial discretion project in New York County, VERA INST. OF JusTICE BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.vera.org/blog/prosecutorial-discretion-project-new-york­county.
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community members would have the added benefit of building and 
improving the prosecutor's relationship with her constituents. 
D. Support from the Bar
The purpose of the public information campaigns is to encourage 
prosecution offices to adopt and implement the PRJ model. However, 
prosecutors are not the only lawyers with a vested interest in fairness 
in the criminal justice system. All lawyers - even those who do not 
have a criminal practice - should be invested in assuring fairness in 
the criminal justice system. For that reason, local and national bar as­
sociations should also sponsor educational programs about racial dis­
parity and the PRJ model as a possible solution. These bar 
associations should encourage their prosecutor members to implement 
the model, and they should provide support when possible. 
The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section has 
sponsored a number of projects with the goal of ensuring racial fair­
ness in the criminal justice system. 136 It might feature a program on
PRJ and even seek a resolution from the ABA House of Delegates 
endorsing the model and encouraging prosecutors to implement it, 
when appropriate. Similar support from the National Bar Association, 
the Hispanic National Bar Association, and state and local bar associa­
tions should also be sought. 
CONCLUSION 
Racial disparity in the criminal justice system is a complex prob­
lem with many disparate causes. Its elimination will require change 
within and outside of the criminal justice system. The socio-economic 
causes of crime may never be totally eliminated. However, individuals 
in the criminal justice system can have an impact on the problem. 
Prosecutors are particularly suited to help eliminate racial disparities 
because of their power and discretion. 
Prosecutors must not only be willing to replicate the Prosecution 
and Racial Justice Program, they must be willing to change their prac­
tices and policies in ways that will have a real impact. Sometimes 
these changes will involve abandoning traditional methods of deci­
sion-making to achieve fairness. For example, even though consider-
136. The most recent project is the ABA's Racial Justice Improvement Project. See
Racial Justice Improvement Project, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://racialjus­
ticeproject.weebly.com/ (last visited June 5, 2013); see also Cynthia Jones, Con­
fronting Race in the Criminal Justice System: The ABA 's Racial Justice Improvement
Project, 27 CRIMINAL JUSTICE I (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/confronting_race_cj_system.pdf.
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ing a defendant's prior record as a factor in the decision to charge is 
appropriate, if the existence of prior records is the main reason why 
otherwise similarly situated black defendants are being charged while 
whites are not, prosecutors should consider abandoning that factor. 
Public safety must remain the priority, but there are many defendants 
arrested for nonviolent offenses with criminal records of nonviolent 
offenses. Even if prosecutors focused on nonviolent offenses alone 
and abandoned or reduced reliance on traditional charging considera­
tions in those cases, they could make a difference. 
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program is not a panacea, but 
it is one remedy that can make a difference. However, it can only 
work with the participation of chief prosecutors who are willing to 
make racial justice a priority. The prosecutors who have worked with 
PRJ have demonstrated that commitment. They took a chance that 
produced positive results in their offices and serve as examples for 
other prosecutors who seek to fulfill their duty to assure a fair and 
effective criminal justice system. 
